Despite the great popularity in the social sciences of macroquantitative, comparative research during the last two decades and despite the hope laid into the approach to be able to carefully test theories about social macrofenomena, it has had only limited lasting impact on theory building. Symptomatic is the lack of robustness of findings. The cause of this problem is the difficulty of dealing with complex macrophenomena by means of statistical analysis. If between-country comparative research relates to independent and identical behavior of individuals which can be portrayed at the macro level by the idea of the representative agent, then the analysis is tricky but not impossible. For macro-level characteristics of social systems this road is closed, however, because the model cannot be based on assumptions about modal behavior. In this case, the sole solution is to accept the limits of small numbers and to improve the elaboration of implication from theoretical considerations.
Introduction 1
The quantitative, cross-country comparative approach has been one of those famous 'growth industries' -or, less flattering, one of those enormous bubbles -which afflicts social science research areas from time to time. This holds in particular for comparative political economy and, more specifically, the analysis of welfare states. Currently, the use of quantitative data and pooled time-series cross-section regression methods seems to be close to a condition for a publication in the most reknown social science journals.
Quantitative comparative research is a method by which hypotheses about correlations between variables are tested on data aggregated at the level of nation states (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 12-13; Pennings, Keman, and Kleinnijenhuis 1999; Schmidt 2003: 262) . 2 Its explicit aim is to causally explain and predict societal phenomena by relying on statistical and econometric techniques. The epistemological background of this approach is the covering law approach according to the deductive-nomological philosophy of science.
In ontological respect, the approach assumes that law-like relationships between social phenomena not only exist but do so independently from time and space. An important reason to for the popularity of this approach is related to the attempts of social scientists to mimic the natural sciences or at least economics in order to defend the relevance of their research in the audience outside of the social scientific community. missing data. Substantively, the aim is often to explain variation between countries with respect to economic or social performance. Among the explanatory factors, government policy and political institutions are attributed a core role. 6 The methodology has not remained uncriticized. Even before the boom of the approach started in the late 1980s, Skocpol and Amenta (1986: 151) argued that "(a) point of diminishing returns seems to have been reached for highly aggregated quantitative analyses inspired by the logic-of-industrialism perspective or the social democratic model." Although they admitted that it is possible to study some program details quantitatively, they recommended focused comparative-historical analyses of a few, wellselected cases. Recently, Molina and Rhodes (2002: 325) 
.)."
This perspective, however, has been formulated within the framework of a battle between different methodological sects and hence had no discernible impact on the adherents of the quantitative approach. Moreover, the comparative-historical school (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003) has not yet provided a compelling alternative to solve their primary aim of finding general social scientific laws at the level of macrophenomena, to which they also claim to adhere. 7 Nancy Cartwright has recently opened a new line of attack against the macroquantitative comparative approach stemming from her reading of the philosophy of science, which culminates in the observation: "Now what strikes me is that this methodology is crazy" (Cartwright 2002b: 142) . The sharpness of this verdict and the academic standing of the judge make this a provocative statement which cannot simply be wiped under the rug. To which extent do we have to accept the verdict and what are its implications for the future of macroquantitative research? 6 See the overview in Kittel and Obinger (2003) and the literature cited therein. 7 See Scharpf (2000 Scharpf ( , 2002 for a discussion of the potential for generalizing findings from macrocomparative research.
Symptoms and Elements of the Problem
I will start my argument with a perhaps somewhat unpopular observation. Reviewing the last two decennia it is difficult to name a contribution relying on a macroquantitative, cross-country analysis which I would regard as a serious candidate to be listed on the required readings list in about 20-30 years from now -in stark contrast to research which is primarily qualitative. 8 Interestingly, Lawrence Summers (1991) came to a similar conclusion with respect to quantitative and qualitative work in economics.
If my observation is correct, something went seriously wrong. In that case, quantitative research would not be good in developing sufficiently persuasive arguments. Blaikie (1993: 19) has argued that innovative research is characterised by new ideas at the level of theory and the empirical analysis is done in an exploratory way which is necessarily qualitative, illustrative, and incomplete. In contrast, quantitative work focuses on testing existing theories and hence conforms more to a 'normal science' which does not produce outstanding ideas. Plausible as it is, this cannot be the only reason for the lack of impressiveness.
{Table 1 about here}
Another important issue relates to the lack of robustness of findings in macroquantitative research designs. Table 1 presents a selection of the results of a variety of time-series cross-section models, taken from Kittel and Winner (2005) . The models are meant to explain the level, respectively first differences, of social expenditures as a percentage of GDP in terms of social, political, and economic factors. Column 1 is a simple pooled OLS regression in levels, column 2 a two-way fixed-effects specification, column 3 a two-way fixed-effects specification correcting for serial correlation by means of a Prais-Winsten transformation, column 4 substitutes a lagged dependent variable for the Prais-Winsten transformation, and column 5 transforms the model into first differences with period fixed effects, including a lagged dependent variable in order to control for remaining serial correlation. Although problematic, I do not want to discuss the technical and substantive aspects of the model specification here. 9 The models presented in Table 1 vary only in the 'technical' part of the specification. Needless to say that alternatives in the substantive part of the specification also have a strong impact on the coefficient estimates. The simple points which I want to make here are (a) that all of these specifications, besides others, have been legitimized and used in contributions to the comparative political economy literature and (b) that they contradict each other.
Hence the most notable symptom of the problem is the insufficient robustness of findings from cross-country statistical analyses. This is also an observation which has early on led to scepticism in economics and econometrics, which has critically accompagnied the forward-thrusting development of new econometric techniques (Robinson 1960; Leamer 1978; Johnston 1992 ) -albeit with little manifest impact. Manipulate the sample, change the period of analysis, add a new control variable, vary the model assumptions, and the chances are large that the size of the estimated effect, the statistical significance or even the sign of the coefficient change to an extent which invalidates all conclusions. 10 In the philosophy of science, this problem is discussed under the heading of the problem of confounders: we do not know which non-observed factors disturb the causal inferences.
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These are not the only problems. Cross-country differences at the level of concepts, definitions, or measurement techniques all have a substantial impact on the robustness of our findings (van Deth 1998; Adcock and Collier 2001) . However, despite the usefulness of improvements in this regard, they are insufficient to undermine Nancy Cartwright's remark about the craziness of using the macroquantitative methodology to solve social scientific research questions, because they only address the symptoms. But the treatment of sysmptoms of craziness will not change the illness proper. In addition, we fail to take notice of an intensive discussion about just the econometric methods which we eagerly try to imitate. In the following I will draw from this discussion to present my argument.
Cartwright asserts that we need very good arguments to assume a stable probability relationship between macrophenomena on the basis of a statistical correlation. Besides being present at the phenomenological level -robustness -they need a theoretical fundament in an understanding of the socio-economic structure which creates the relationship. Cartwright (2002: 143) claims that not only the first but also the second of 10 There is little consensus in the comparative political economy field with regard to the technically correct specification of models. Compare, for example, Huber and Stephens (2001) with Kittel and Obinger (2003) , or see the recent exchange between Green, Kim, and Yoon (2001) and Beck and Katz (2001) , King (2001) , and Oneal and Russett (2001) . 11 A useful overview of the state of the discussion on the role of intervening variables in statistical analysis can be found in McKim and Turner (1997) .
these conditions is not met in situations which are typically analyzed via a quantitative approach: "Each of the countries studied has a different socio-economic structure constituting a different socio-economic machine that will generate different causal relations true in that country and concomitantly different probability measures appropriate for the quantities appearing in these relations".
Let us take a closer look at the macroquantitative approach. The point of departure is variation is a specific, interesting variable, for example public social expenditures. Why are these expenditures higher in some countries than in others? A prominent candidate explanatory variable during the last decennium has been globalization (see, e.g., Swank
1998; Schulze and Ursprung 1999; Mosley 2000; Burgoon 2001; Garrett and Mitchell 2001) . In order to analyze the relationship in a social scientifically relevant way, we need a theory which presents a reason why globalization should lead to higher social expenditures. 12 Such theories are numerous (Rodrik 1998) . Using Stinchcombe's (1968: 13) standard of theoretical creativity, I will briefly outline three contendending propositions, one by an economist, one by a political scientist, and one by a sociologist.
Although I do not relate these arguments to any particular author, they can be easily traced in the literature.
The economist might argue that globalization leads to the relocation of production processes to low-wage countries, causing employees in OECD countries to become unemployed for at least a period of adjustment. Since these employees are covered by social security systems, they will make claims on unemployment benefits or early retirement schemes, which will cause public social expenditures to rise.
The political scientist might propose the hypothesis that the possibility of relocation of production processes to low-wage countries will raise fears of unemployment among the population. For that reason they vote for parties which promise to improve welfare provisions during their election campaigns. Since these parties have to make true at least some of their promises, they will for example enlarge welfare entitlements, thereby causing social expenditures to rise.
The sociologist could present the following proposition: Globalization has two implications. On the one hand, production processes will be relocated to low-wage countries. On the other hand, the widened horizon will encourage people to move larger distances in search of a job. 13 Both factors burden the financial situation of families and migration reduces social cohesiveness. Hence the standard of living of the affected families is reduced and the family's role as a social net is lost. Both developments shift the responsibility for social care provision to the state, which induces the latter to increase the social security system. As a result, social expenditures rise. 13 This presentation takes into account the well-nurtured view of sociologists that real-world complexity should be reflected in our models. 14 In order not to complicate the presentation, I do not discuss the problem in the context of a pooled timeseries cross-section situation but with respect to a simple cross-country regression for a single period. Although a pure cross-sectional design is currently not regarded as state of the art, the time dimension does not add anything to the argument in the present paper. Nevertheless, I would like to add a note to this issue. As a matter of fact, it should be self-evident that a hypothesis relating to cross-country differences should be analyzed in a cross-country research design (Jackman 1985) . This truism seems to have been buried by the fancy of panel designs being applied without adequate reflection of the intricate substantive and technical problems invoked by this change of research design. Panel designs are certainly not useless. But I claim that not every hypothesis is best explored by analyzing panel data. 15 I do not address the question whether such a statistical test is meaningful at all in this situation, although it is a pertinent one. 16 A more detailed analysis of the plot reveals that the relationship is crucially dependent on the location of Sweden, The Netherlands, and Belgium. Hence any variable capturing the jointness of these three countries will probably demolish the finding in the text.
Still, we have a big problem: all our three academic heros will, after having summarized their findings in an article and having sent it to a reknown journal, walk home toward the sunset, satisfied for having solved one more big issue in comparative political economy.
But which of the three theories explains the relationship? The statistical analysis at the level of macrophenomena does not tell us this detail.
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Conditions for Empirical Regularities
From a realist perspective on the philosophy of science, causal relations between macrophenomena must be supported by a microlink which spells out the steps of transformation from the explanatory macrophenomena to the disposition of microphenomena, a stable link between these dispositions and microbehavior, and the aggregation of microphenomena to the macrophenomenon which has to be explained (Bhaskar 1979; Bunge 1997; Mayntz 2004 ). In the social sciences this idea has received much attention as the "bathtub" model of social explanation (Coleman 1990 ). In the example discussed in the previous section we are confronted with a situation in which the direct link between globalization and social expenditures is not warranted because the intermediate steps are not tested. For example, in the sociologist's example, one first has to proof that the number of jobs does indeed decline due to the relocation of production processes. Then one would have to show that the unemployed move elsewhere to find a new job and that this leads to a decrease in family bonds and traditional care functions are not delivered anymore. Finally one would have to show that this problem is articulated as a political issue, that it becomes part of government policy, that no veto players impede the policy's implementation, and that this policy leads to the measured differences in the level of social expenditures. For the economist's and political scientist's argument, a similar causal chain has to be established.
Each step in this explanatory chain could be further elaborated and divided into even smaller steps and the complexity underlying the macro-level causal statement is enormous.
How much easier would be the social scientist's task if we could replace the microfundament by a black box! This solution would entail to be able to replace the explanatory chain by a social mechanism. A social mechanism is a causal process connection between an explanans and an explanandum which relies on a stylized relationship on a lower level of aggregation -for example individuals -and which is accepted as given in a particular science (Hedström and Swedberg 1998) . 18 In the explanation of the social macrophenomenen, the mechanism fulfills a similar role as a law of nature in the natural sciences. 19 For clarification, let us briefly look at a thermodynamic example. We can calculate the pressure of a gas if we have measured the temperature by invoking the first law of thermodynamics and specifying the framework conditions. In this process, we do not need to know the behavior of each gas molecule, although the resulting pressure is the result of the aggregate behavior of these molecules. The first law of thermodynamics thus describes the status of a gas via state equations which are solely dependent on the start and end conditions, without being explicitely based on a microfundament.
In fact, macroquantitative research attempts to do the same. In the example of the effect of globalization on social expenditures we argue that there is a law-like relationship between the level of social expenditure and the level of globalization. The use of a statistical model presupposes the existence of a theoretical model in which a unit shift in globalization implies a shift in social expenditures by a fixed amount. By construction of the regression model, this association must hold symmetrically in both directions (Lieberson 1985) .
Under what conditions are we allowed to substitute a mechanism for the explanatory chain? I contend that the crucial problem is associated to the aggregative transformation of microbehavior to macrophenomena. The thermodynamic example suggests two conditions.
Firstly, the behavioral pattern of the objects of study at the microlevel must be identical and independent, and, secondly, the number of objects at the micro level must be sufficiently large to imply a 'typical' pattern at the macro level.
18 There is currently no consensus about the definition of mechanisms. For example, Mahoney (2001) has presented a collection of 24 different conceptions. 19 While laws are general statements about the covariation of macrostates, mechanisms point to the underlying processes causing these covariations (Mayntz 2004) . But mechanisms rest on their part on laws holding at the microlevel of the analysis (Bunge 2004) .
Let me first discuss the behavioral condition. In the thermodynamic example, identity of behavior means that, given exactly the same starting conditions, two gas molecules must exhibit the same behavior. 20 The crucial point is that we can substitute one molecule for another without affecting our behavioural prediction. Independence has two dimensions:
Firstly, the law must hold if no intervening factors are present which disturb the relationship; hence the ceteris paribus condition. 21 Secondly, one molecule's behavior must not be affected by the behavior of other molecules except in the unproblematic sense of collisions. 22 These two elements enable us to abstract from the microlevel and to substitute the first law of thermodynamics for the analysis of the process of acceleration of individual molecules and the ensuing increase in the number of collisions with the sides of the container. Experiments in the natural sciences manipulate the situation in order to shelter the predicted relationship from external influences. "The test of all knowledge is experiment" (Feynman, Leighton, and Sands 1963: 1-1) . Because of the need to artificially create a test situation, the laws of the natural sciences are not visible by mere, simple observation. For the same reason, neither would be the laws of social interaction, if they exist.
In the social sciences, neither identity nor independence of behavior are warranted because of the reflective nature of the action capacity of individuals (Schütz 1962; Boudon 1979 ).
For example, while in the textbook market consumers are expected to respond to a rise in the price by reducing demand, some individuals will value a higher-priced product even more and others do not respond in the expected way because of addiction or perceived lack of alternatives. The individual situation and individual preferences will cause each actor to respond differently to the social fact of an increase in the price level. In order to shelter an empirical test of the textbook market mechanism, all intervening variables have to be taken into account and the test has to be sheltered like in the natural sciences (Lawson 1997: 77-79) . Experimental economists and psychologists hence invest much in the attempt to 20 A somewhat less strict condition, more appropriate to a modern natural science ontology, would state that the molecules must stochastically reveal the same behavior. This does not affect the argument in the text. 21 See, for a recent revival of the discussion of ceteris paribus conditions, among others, Woodward (2002) and Cartwright (2002a) . 22 Collisions are unproblematic in this context because they do not involve intentionality. Max Weber has given a nice illustration of the difference: "A mere collision of two cyclists may be compared to a natural event. On the other hand, their attempt to avoid hitting each other (…) would constitute 'social action'" (Weber 1978: 23) control the set of available actions in laboratory research (Liebrand, Messink, and Wilke 1992; van Winden 2002) .
But do we need the behavioral condition in all instances? Perhaps the second condition, the large number of individuals, is sufficient in order to show causal associations in nonexperimental research. The question thus is whether we need to know each actor's behavior in the process of aggregating individual behavior into macrophenomena. This question has been denied by one of the earliest contributors to a positivist approach to the social sciences, Lambert Adolphe Quetelet, by inventing a dummy agent, l'homme moyen:
"Si l'on cherche à établir, en quelque sorte, les bases d'une physique sociale, c'est lui (l'homme moyen) qu'on doit considérer, sans s'arrêter aux cas particuliers ni aux anomalies (…)" (Quetelet 1835: 21) . Then the strict condition of identical behavior is not necessary and the aggregation to the macrophenomenon can be based on a probability distribution. 23 Quetelet used the newly invented normal distribution for this assumption.
Hence the central limit theorem is invoked for establishing macro-level regularities on which law-like statements can be based.
Modern economics calls this dummy the representative agent. If we could replace this agent's behavior by a mechanism and if we are confronted with a large number of individuals, we can rely on Adam Smith's (1904 Smith's ( (1776 ) invisible hand to analyze relationships between macrophenomena. The market mechanism replaces the explanatory chain, which we do not question anymore. Hence the solution offered by mainstream economics relies on a specific assumption about the representative agent's behavior: it is homo economicus, a rational, utility-maximizing individual who enables us to generalize microbehavior into macrophenomena.
Other economic perspectives which do not accept the simple homo economicus, for example approaches which focus on 'bounded rationality' (Jones 1999 ), attempt to model the diversity of individual action orientations. Some argue that this solution results in an infinite regression because at any level of aggregation, a micromechanism legitimzing the simplification at the next-higher level has to be found. Followed to its logical implications one would end up explaining social macrophenomena by mechanisms at the subatomic 23 After the quantum mechanical revolution, also physics has shifted to a probabilistic formulation of natural laws: "(N)ature, as we understand it today, behaves in such a way that it is fundamentally impossible to make a precise prediction of exactly what will happen in a given experiment. (…) (W)e can find only an average, statistically, as to what happens" (Feynman, Leighton, and Sands 1963: 2-6 ).
level (Kincaid 1996: 179) . This, according to this view, implies that the whole econometric approach for analyzing macrophenomena has to be drowned (Kincaid 1996: 179-182; Lawson 1997: 80) .
However, this strategy of reductio ad absurdum is invalid because we need to ask at which level of emergence the relevant fundament is laid for the explanation of social macrophenomena (Steel 2004 ). The problems for causal inferences in the social sciences result from the fact that individuals have the capacity to reflect on their actions and act strategically. This is an emergent characteristic of humans and a further reduction to psychological and physiological states or neuronal currents is unneccessary. A mechanism relating to individual human action is sufficient to explain social macrophenomena.
Kevin Hoover is more optimistic about the potential of regression models at the macro level. Although he accepts the whole problematic, he insists that regularities can be found at the level of social macrophenomena. Despite the impossibility to predict individual behavior, in practice sufficient individuals act in an identical way, thereby producing stochastic but stable regularities at the macro level. For example the relationship between the excitement level of a soccer game at the European Championship and the pattern of water usage is stable across all European countries and repeated at every Championship.
From this point of view, the problem is not in econometrics but in our expectations about its possibilities: "Econometrics is not about measuring covering laws. It is about observing unobvious regularities" (Hoover 2002: 173) .
However, accepting this rescue of the econometric methodology drowns the very ambition of macroquantitative research. If the only aim of econometrics is to reveal unobvious regularities, then the approach gives up the aim of testing theories assumed to be independent of space and time; it becomes a highly sophisticated variant of descriptive statistics.
What is the conclusion of this reasoning? Macrosocial regularties are observable. We can expect them to appear if some conditions hold (see also Stinchcombe 1991: 378) . These are in any case:
1. If most individuals in the same situation act independently from each other in identical ways we can speak of a typical behavioral pattern, personified in the representative agent.
2. This typical behavior is described with a simple theory of action as, for example, rational choice theory. In the specific case that this behavior follows a logic of material cost-benefit evaluation, the representative agent is the homo economicus.
3. The distribution of individual behavior can be described by a simple function, as, for example, the normal curve, which is used for aggregating identical and independent individual behavior into the social macrophenomenon.
Collective Action and Macroquantitative Research
These considerations lead to my core proposition. In the research area which has witnessed a particular extensive proliferation of macroquantitative comparative research at the level of national aggregates, broadly circumscribed by the notion of comparative political economy, the generation of such plausibility claims legitimizing the methodology is unwarranted. Briefly summarized, the problem is the following: In contrast to the the situations discussed above, political economy is seldom concerned with aggregate individual behavior but with system elements of a society. Important topics of research are the influence of institutions (formal and informal rules of a political system) and collective political actors (for example, parties and interest groups) on economic and social developments, performance indicators, and, in particular, government policy.
This proposition is perhaps neither immediately clear nor acceptable at first sight. Why is there a difference between aggregated individual behavior and characteristics of the aggregate system and why should that difference have such far-reaching implications? It is perhaps best to start with a distinction between two types of social interaction, which Peter
Abell has termed parametric and strategic interaction (Abell 2003: 5) . In the case of parametric interaction there is no connection between the behavior of actors. Each individual responds independently from each other to external stimuli and the assumption of identity of responses holds statistically by some unimodal distribution. This is the situation sketched above. In the case of strategic interaction, however, the assumption of independence and identity of behavior are not applicable by definition, since strategic interaction implies that the actors respond to each other's behavior.
On this foundation, the distinction between aggregate individual behavior and system characteristics can be clarified by outlining the difference between the individual consumption decision in a market situation and the collective decision on the government's macroeconomic policy. The behavior in a market situation can be explored at two levels, via a microanalysis of individual behavior and via a macroanalysis of aggregate behavior.
In the microanalysis a regression model is estimated in which the coefficient identifies the representative agent's behavior and the standard error is used as a proxy for the amount of variation in behavior. Hence the standard error tells us how well the representative agent does its job. The more 'abnormal' behavior occurs in a collectivity, the larger is the standard error of the coefficient. In contrast, in the macroanalysis, the information about the variation of individual behavior is swallowed by the representative agent because the collectivity is not represented anymore by the distribution of a variable, but solely by its average. The empirical variance is substituted by an assumption. It follows that the quality of the coefficient calculated in a regression model depends on the representativity of the mean, the representative agent, for the collectivity of individuals. Thus the assumptions of independence and identity of behavior at the micro level, jointly with the law of large numbers, justify the validity of the quantitative analysis of aggregate data at the macro level.
In the case of government actions we are confronted with a completely different situation. I will develop the implications in three steps. Firstly, government action is not based on a large number of individual decisions which are aggregated ex post, but on one single collective decision which results from the ex ante aggregation of various opinions about the decision to be taken. This is the core issue: The transformation of individual preferences to the macro level takes place before the action to be analyzed takes place.
Thus at the macro level we are faced with a different type of representative agent, the collective actor. This actor, however, is not identical with l'homme moyen. The collective action has been preceded by a deliberative process of collective policy formation which has selected one particular collective option from the multitude of possibilities. Both crucial assumptions, independence and identity, are indefensible in this situation.
This leads to the second step. The deliberative character of the one collective decision implies that the central limit theorem cannot be referred to for legitimizing the micromacro transformation. This situation is discussed under the heading 'social choice problem' (Ordeshook 1986; Sandler 2001; Mueller 2003) . This literature's most relevant provisional conclusion for the present question is that most of the general situation do either have no or infinitely many analytical equilibrium solutions, both of which impede the prediction of a collective decision (Sandler 2001: 93-94) . It follows that the representative agent cannot be replaced by an alternative, more complex transformation rule. The real-world solution will under these conditions be dependent on the specific framework conditions, among which the existing variety of interests and ideas, the power relations, and the rule systems in the collectivity.
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This brings us, in a third step, to the answer to the question whether macroquantitative comparative research uses a crazy methodology. Do we have to accept this judgement and which implications would the acceptance have? John Goldthorpe, for example, suggests that "certain phenomena that macrosociologists have sought to study (…) turn out to be ones on which theory can give relatively little cognitive grasp at all. (…) (T)hey appear too few, too independent, and too causally heterogeneous for anything of much use to be said in theoretical terms" (Goldthorpe 2000a: 63) . 25 In other words: We would indeed be crazy to continue using a crazy methodology for the analysis of social macrophenomena.
Does this mean that we should stop using macroquantitative comparative research designs?
I believe that such an implication is unwarranted but that the conclusion should induce us to read the user's manual of this method of analysis more carefully.
Firstly, the attempt to test social scientific theories of social macrophenomena with the usual statistical macromodels is doomed to fail in general.
Secondly, however, this does not rule out that statistical model can be useful devices for describing non-evident regularities which can be placed on a microfoundation by virtue of 24 The fact that events at the macro level resulting from an ex ante transformation from the micro to the macro level, do not rest on a fundament of a modal behavioral pattern, has serious consequences for the specification of a statistical model. For example, in the market model mentioned in the text above we can assume that the representative agent does not only exhibit a particular response to a change in the price of a product but also needs a certain amount of time to respond. Furthermore, the reaction will have a particular pattern over time. Thus we can assume a specific amount of inertia and a specific lag pattern which can be captured by coefficients referring to the modal behavior. In the case of, for example, the effect of the composition of government on social expenditure, however, it is much more difficult to give substantive content to a coefficient. One government initiates reforms of the social system which have first measurable effects only 30 years later, while another changes the system with immediate consequences. One government chooses the road of lengthy negotiations with various interest groups in order to put forward an encompassing and enduring reform, the other chooses for many small steps. One government implements a reform only to be replaced by a different government which undoes the reform, another government is unable to implement a reform decision because of early elections. While one could continue citing such examples, the question is how all these incalculable and, because of the social choice problem, unpredictable variation can be summarized in a single coefficient which is independent of time and space. How can we even expect to find a systematic empirical relationship between two variables under these conditions? 25 Similar positions have been forwarded by Little (1993) , Lieberson (1997), and Hall (2003) .
the law of large numbers and the idea of the representative agent of independent and identical individuals and which can be aggregated ex post.
Thirdly, the attempt to describe theories about macrophenomena containing emergent characteristics at the system level with the help of statistical models is indeed doomed to fail. Because of the aggregation ex ante we cannot make use of a probability distribution for describing these macrophenomena. They are the result of a strategic interaction between individuals and/or collective actors. From this it follows that the probability of existence of stochastic regularities at the macro level is low.
Implications for Macrocomparative Research
Wat does this conclusion imply for cross-country comparative research on politicaleconomic macrophenomena such as political institutions, policy processes and welfare regimes and their effect on economic and social performance? These are topics which are clearly set at the macro level and which have been the object of a large amount of research using statistical and econometric techniques. I am afraid that my argument does not have encouraging implications for macrocomparative research in this area. 26 None of the conditions which I have mentioned are unambiguously applicable to this kind of data.
Although I do not share the position that quantitative comparative research employs a crazy methodology at the level of generality invoked by Nancy Cartwright, I believe that the critique which is entailed in this verdict certainly is applicable to macrosocial phenomena which are based on collective action.
I do not have a ready-made solution for the problem of causal inference in macrocomparative research. But the challenge formulated by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) at the general level by claiming the quantitative approach to be the single legitimate template for all social scientific research has fostered a methodological debate during the last decennium about the possibilities for alternatives without questioning its ontological and epistemological foundation (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Collier and Brady 26 Let me stress once again that my critical contention does only apply to macroquantitative research using data which is aggregated at the level of the nation state which refer to system characteristics. My critique does explicitely not affect microquantitative research using data at the individual level, which, however, can only deal with macrophenomena that fulfill the requirements of aggregation discussed in the text.
2004; George and Bennett 2005)
. 27 The central issue in this debate has been formulated several years ago in a lucid way by Norbert Elias: "Social scientists are (...) much too eager to take over the prestigious models from older sciences" (Elias 1970: 60) .
If the aim of social scientific research is to find "laws" of human interaction in collectivities, as the representatives of quantitative comparative research design propose, the characteristics of modern societal arrangements may be the wrong place to start. There is a contradiction in principle between the idea of laws which are independent of space and time and the use of nation states as cases since the latter are specific to a particular historical time and space on earth.
One solution is the one suggested by Goldthorpe (2000a: 63) , which I above: Social macrophenomena which are not deductible from 'typical' individual behavior but which are the result of a multidimensional interaction between individual or between groups within a collectivity, are too dependent of the specific social constellation and the indiosyncratic historical situation for being able to produce predictable regularities at the macro level. In consequence, the analysis of macrophenomena, which become singular events by this argument, would have to follow historical more than social scientific rules of inference.
This solution, however, is inattractive because it leads into the very impasse which it tried to avoid. As Carl Hempel (1965) has argued 60 years ago, a historical analysis has to show which factors explain the outcome and this explanation has to be based on the presence of specific manifestations of a regularity to be accepted as a sequence with a causal status (Abell 2004: 294) . The existence of a regularity rests on the understanding of a typical pattern of behavior which is gained by comparison with other phenomena. But if macrophenomena are indeed regarded as sigular events, then a comparison is problematic in principle. As a result, the analysis lacks a foundation for the generalization of the findings. This problem has yet to be solved in the recently intensified methodological debate in comparative historical analysis (see Skocpol and Somers 1980; Goldthorpe 2000b; Mahoney 2004) . 27 But note that this is just one dimension of the debate. From an interpretive perspective the methodological problems of the quantitative approach are hidden much deeper in ontological assumptions (Yanow 2003) . I do not deal with this issue here (Moses, Rihoux, and Kittel 2005) .
In fact this solution undermines the macrocomparative endeavour in total because it declines the possibility of a social scientific analysis of system-level phenomena as states and institutions in principle. This conflicts with the proposition that system characteristics are emergent phenomena which cannot be fully reduced to lower levels of aggregation, although they are surely part of the observable world of empirical phenomena constituted by the interaction between individuals. As such, however, they are legitimate objects of analysis. In order to maintain the social scientific perspective, which emphasizes the explanation of systematic relationships instead of the explanation of specific events, it may be better to take into account three aspects in the analysis of macrophenomena which might be regarded as some sort of 'guiding principles'. I do not regard them as a solution to the problem presented in this paper. Whether this problem is soluble at all must be left as a problem of the philosophy of the social sciences. In the meantime, however, they might be pragmatic points of departure for analyzing macrophenomena in a more responsible way than the macroquantitative perspective, being locked into a dogmatic approach, has suggested in recent years. I illustrate the principles by reference to some of my own work, not because I believed that these were the best examples, but because they result from methodological afterthoughts on my research contributions.
The first principle is to indeed throw over board the theory-testing attitude of macroquantitative research, as Kevin Hoover has suggested, and to award this approach an explorative status. Given the toil of appropriating the necessary econometric techniques which allow to assess the validity and robustness of results, this is certainly a disappointing principle. But robust correlations can, even if they are not based on large random samples, point towards interesting causal relationships which might turn out to be fruitful for a theoretically more elaborate analysis.
For example, the literature on the influence of trade unions on economic performance has produced two contradictory classical hypotheses. According to neoliberally inspired scholars, trade unions are collusions of workers which appropriate a larger share of the economic surplus than would be appropriate for sustainable economic performance (Weede 1996; Siebert 1997) . These author indeed find a negative association between union density and economic performance when comparing twenty-odd OECD countries over the last 25-30 years. In contrast, authors inspired by neocorporatist reasoning follow Olson's (1982) side-remark about the beneficial effects of encompassing organisation which internalize the externalities of their behavior (Golden 1993) . was almost perfect to analyze the differences in outcome due to union density and concentration at the sectoral level (Kittel 2000b) . It probably comes at no surprise that the largest conflicts relating to the implementation of the new working time regulations occured in a constellation in which the trade union represents nearly 100% of the workers in a small, homogeneous sector, leading to enduring deadlock. In contrast, and equally expected, a badly organized trade union in a small sector was happy to accept any wishes the employers had. The results in the highly concentrated sectors were equally consistent with the expectations. The low-density union concluded the negotiations on the new sector-level regulation even before the law was proclaimed with a result which appeared acceptable to both sides, while the high-density union's negotiations had to overcome severe conflicts which led to a one-year delay in the conclusion of the agreement in order to impose a somewhat more beneficial solution than the former.
This episode reveals that it is possible to look for rough associations in a first step by means of an exploratory quantitative analysis and to elaborate these associations into a theoretical argument. In a second step, the model is then tested empirically in a specific situation. This reverses, for macrocomparative research designs, the 'classical' relationship between quantitative and qualitative research, according to which a qualitative exploration has to be followed by a quantitative test. Although my own research benefitted from chance, I suspect that by systematically screening empirical situations, crucial cases with the appropriate constellation of potentially confounding factors can be found more often.
This approach is simplified if the causal chain to be tested is shortened. This is the second In my view, the third principle is the need to more carefully elaborate the theoretical model by dividing the macrophenomenen into its constituting elements which can be better analyzed. This rather obvious idea has yet had too little impact on macro-level research in comparative political economy, although it has received increasing attention and debate in recent years, most notably related to the "Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models"
(EITM) project (Morton 1999; Clarke and Primo 2004) . In between the implicit assumption of homogeneity and the totalizing claim of uniqueness in historical analysis lies a broad area with potential for a nuanced development of theoretical propositions.
Even if it would be accepted that macrophenomena are idiosyncratic in the sense of their dependence on the specific context and historical situation, this dependence could only be stated by citing the mechanisms which extert their influence in this particular context and that particular historical situation.
28
A macrosocial phenomenon is the result of a variety of mechanisms which relate to different aspects, or dimensions, of the phenomenon (Bunge 1997: 417-418 Mayntz (2002) discusses some characteristics of macrophenomena which impede theory development and which suggest to rely on an explanation via mechanisms. 29 My conceptualization is based on Schmitter and Streeck (1999) . 30 To be fully correct, I have to mention that Simon has laid the theoretical foundation for this dilemma which has been elaborated by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) , Ross (1973) , and Sappington (1991) .
4. The problem of influence in external relations refers to the strategic interaction between collective actors. These can be analyzed via recent game theoretical models focusing on repeated signaling games (van Winden 2003) .
In the strategic interaction between interest groups and between them and the state all actors must solve these four dilemmas simultaneously. The search for the causes of success and failure could thus start from the specific constellation of these dilemmas and the behavior of interest groups could then be deduced from the interaction of these theretical modules. But assuming that these four dilemmas were a complete enumeration of all social mechanisms involved in this theoretical problem, and assuming that each has only two solutions, then we are faced with 2 4 = 16 possible combinations. This implies that, given the restricted number of cases to which the theory applies, we have to deal with practically singular phenomena. But each mechanism is based on at least one micro-level regularity which is comparable to other phenomena at a higher level of abstraction.
On such a higher level of abstraction, cooperative situations at different levels of group formation can be analyzed and compared. The more a macrophenomenon is analytically divided into smaller modules consisting of a single mechanism referring to a short link which is theoretically well-based on a microregularity, the less difficult it is to replace the representative agent by a transformation mechanism based on an interactive relationship.
From that perspective, the explanation of a complex macrophenomenen rests on the combination of a set of theoretical modules, each of which, in turn, is based on an empirical regularity at the micro level. Hence, this approach also ends up on the problem of the microfoundation without being able to recur to the simple solution of the representative agent. But the theory modules are more easily captured than the initial research question and the representative agent is less cumbersomely replaced by a partial model of aggregation resting on an interactive relationship.
A less ambitious task for quantitative research, shorter causal chains, and better elaborated theories on a microfoundation are three principles which will certainly not solve the inferential problems of macrocomparative research. They are neither new nor sensational, like most other elements of my argument. But they were used too little by too few scholars during the last decade in research practice. As a result, much research degenerated to an exercise in econometric techniques instead of contributing to the cumulative development of a better understanding of social macrophenomena by elaborating an element of the causal explanation of this kind of empirical realities. Notes: Models 1-4 in levels, model 5 in first differences (except for left cabinet portfolios and christian-democratic cabinet protfolios). Constant and fixed effects not reported; * α ≤ 0.10; ** α ≤ 0.05; *** α ≤ 0.01. 17 countries; annual observations, 1961-1993. All models are more fully reported, including various tests and an explanation of their rationale, in Kittel and Winner (2005) . 
